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Abstract: 
 This study examines whether variations in restrictiveness of trade policy on the flow of international trade 
explain Total Factor Productivity (TFP) differences across countries. The study employs Trade Restrictiveness 
Indices (TRIs) to measure trade policy. The TRIs are aggregated using data at the tariff line level, which 
enable the study to overcome the aggregation bias characterizing the commonly used trade policy 
measures such as average tariff and import-weighted average tariff. TRIs for Non-Tariff Barriers on imports 
(NTB), import tariffs and export restrictions are used to show the relative restrictiveness of various types of 
trade policy on TFP. In line with the political economy literature, the trade restrictiveness measure based on 
NTB is instrumented using past trade shares while identifying the former’s effect on TFP. Using IV 
regression, the study shows that trade restrictiveness based on NTB explains a significant variation in TFP 
across countries while trade restrictiveness based on import tariff or export restrictions does not have a 
significant effect on TFP. Hence, countries should reduce NTBs on their imports to allow a gain in TFP 
associated with trade. Besides, the findings suggest that countries should substitute the more restrictive and 
less transparent trade policy, i.e., NTBs with the less restrictive and more transparent trade policy, i.e., 
Tariffs. 
Key Words: Export restrictions, import Tariffs, NTBs, TFP, trade policy, TRIs 
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1. Introduction 
 
Disparity in standards of living across countries remains very high.  Recent development accounting 
exercises such as Hall and Jones (1999), and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) have shown that 
a greater proportion of the per capita income variation across countries is explained by differences 
in their Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Their findings highlight the need to understand why such a 
significant difference in TFP exists.  
Among other factors, international trade is considered to be a deep determinant of TFP. Trade 
facilitates the process of technology adoption (see Holmez and Schmitz, 1995); and it promotes 
resource reallocation from less efficient to more efficient firms, thereby promoting overall 
productivity (see Melitz, 2003).  A country’s trade performance, however, is an outcome of a number 
of factors such as its trade policy, per capita income, whether it has access to the sea, etc. From a 
policy making view point, an effort to investigate the role of trade for TFP, therefore, needs to ask 
whether the determinants of trade (and not trade itself) could influence TFP.  That is what the current 
study does. It asks whether trade policy explains significant TFP variation across countries.  
 
Analyzing the effect of trade policy on TFP necessitates a proper measure of trade policy. The 
commonly used trade policy measures include trade share, Sachs-Warner index, average tariff, and 
import-weighted average tariff. All of the above measures, however, have drawbacks as to their 
proper measurement of the relative restrictiveness of trade policy across countries. As stated earlier, 
trade share, being an outcome measure, cannot properly index trade policy. The use of average tariff 
on the other hand deems a country as more open when it reduces tariffs while substituting it with 
higher non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Moreover, using average tariff attach equal economic importance 
for trade in different goods while import-weighted average tariff underestimates the restrictiveness of 
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trade policy in the presence of prohibitive tariffs. Sachs-Warner index measures a broader 
macroeconomic policy which makes it difficult to use as a measure of trade policy per se.   The current 
study measures trade policy using recently constructed trade restrictivensss indices (TRIs) that are 
estimated using tariff, non tariff barriers, imports and exports at the tariff line level. Moreover, import 
demand elasticities, measuring the economic importance of the good are used as weights while 
aggregating trade distortions from the tariff line level. Both features render the use of these trade 
restrictiveness indices to measure trade policy as more theoretically sound.  No previous study has 
used the TRIs to measure trade policy in a TFP regression. The study uses TRIs constructed using 
import tariffs by a country on its own imports; tariff by trading partners on a countries exports and 
NTBs by a country on its own imports.  
 
Consistent with the political economy literature, the study treats NTBs as endogenously determined. 
As such, NTB is instrumented using past trade shares. Tariffs, however, are usually bound by bilateral 
or multilateral agreements. For this reason, the study treats tariffs as exogenous. OLS, 2SLS, LIML 
estimation techniques are used while trying to identify the effect of trade policy on TFP. 
 
Using the newly constructed and more theoretically sound TRIs as a trade policy measure, this study 
aims to examine if part of the variation in TFP across countries is explained by the differences in the 
restrictiveness of their trade policy. The findings suggest that variation in the levels of import 
restrictions by NTBs explain significant differences in TFP, while variations in the levels of import 
restrictions by tariff or export restrictions by tariffs does not explain a significant difference in TFP 
across countries.  
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The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section two makes a brief review of 
the literature on the TFP-trade policy nexus. Section three specifies the model, presents the data and 
discusses the estimation strategy. Section four discusses the findings while section five concludes.  
2. The TFP - Trade/Trade Policy nexus: theory and empirics 
The mechanisms identified by most of the existing theories on how trade/trade policy impacts TFP 
include technology diffusion, learning by doing, market size (economies of scale), and competition 
through entry and exit, thereby facilitating intra industry resource reallocation.   
Evidences show that only few developed countries can afford to make the huge research and 
development (R&D) investment cost to benefit from the use of advanced technology.1  Allowing 
movement of technology embodying goods and interaction of individuals, trade enables technology 
diffusion thereby enhancing TFP in areas that may otherwise produce with old and inefficient 
technology. Trade policy orientation, being one determinant of trade volume, either facilitates or 
impedes the process of technology diffusion with a resulting impact on TFP or long run per capita 
income (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Parente and Prescott, 1994; Holmes and Shimitz, 1995; 
Andre’s Rodriguez Clare, 1996).    Another mechanism by which openness affect TFP is through 
reallocation of resources from less efficient to more efficient firms (Melitz, 2003).  The role of trade 
policy that promotes openness in this case would thus be to facilitate reallocation of resources from 
less efficient to more efficient firms, thereby enhancing aggregate productivity.  
Empirically, various studies have found a significant positive effect of openness on TFP or TFP 
growth (TFPG) (see for example Hall and Jones, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2004; Miller and 
                                                          
1  In 1991 for example, industrial countries accounted for about 96% of the world R&D. Within the OECD, the 7 largest 
economies accounted for 92% of R&D in the same year (Coe et al 1997). 
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Upadyay, 2000; Choudri and Hakura, 2000, Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001).     In order to set a 
stage for the analysis in the subsequent sections, section 3 below specifies the model and discusses 
issues related to data, identification strategy, estimation techniques & inference.  
3. Model Specification, Data and Estimation Techniques  
 
In line with the common practice in the literature, the TFP equation is specified as in (1) below where 
TFP depends on trade policy, institutions and geographic characteristics.2 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝑃𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖  + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐻𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                    (1) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 is the natural logarithm of  TFP in country 𝑖. It is  derived from a Cobb – Douglas  
production function as a residual, where real GDP per worker is disaggregated in to capital intensity 
and human capital per worker, following Hall and Jones (1999) (henceforth HJ). The formal 
derivation of TFP is shown in Appendix B. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝑃𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖 represents the restrictiveness of trade 
policy in country 𝑖 on the flow of its international trade. As will be discussed later, the study employs 
three trade policy variables that proxy restrictiveness of trade policy on import or export. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 
measures governance quality in country 𝑖; 𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐻𝑌𝑖 represents measures of geographic 
characteristics. The study controls for a measure of distance from the equator, a dummy for being 
land locked and continent dummies.  𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 See for example Hall and Jones (1999) for similar specifications.  
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3.1 Description of ‘core’ determinants. 
3.1.1 Trade policy 
To measure the role of trade policy on TFP that could be channelled through the former’s effect on 
import, I have included two trade policy indices that measure the restrictiveness of a country’s trade 
policy on its imports.  The first index measures the restrictiveness of a country’s non tariff barriers 
on its imports. It measures the restrictiveness of a core NTB across a tariff line for which there is a 
core NTB in the country.  It is named in the current study as the overall trade restrictiveness index 
based on Non Tariff Barriers (OTRI_NTB). The core non tariff barriers used in the computation of 
OTRI_NTB include quotas, technical regulations and other non-tariff barriers (Kee et al, 2009). The 
second index measures the restrictiveness of a country’s tariff barriers on its imports. It is named as 
overall trade restrictiveness index based on tariff (OTRI_TARIF).3  To measure the effect of trade 
policy that runs through the other channel of openness, namely export, I have included a trade policy 
index that measures restriction on a country’s export by all trading partners of the home country. The 
index is known as Market Access Overall Trade restrictiveness index (MA_OTRI).  This measure is 
a proxy for trade policy of all trading partners of the home country for the latter’s exports.4 The 
country level data on the three trade policy measures are aggregated using import, export and trade 
policy data at the tariff line level. This reduces the aggregation bias present in using average tariffs, 
for example, for the latter implicitly assumes equal restrictiveness of tariffs in different tariff lines. 
As far as I know, no study so far has used this family of trade restrictiveness indices to identify the 
role of trade policy on TFP.  
                                                          
3 Appendix B shows a formal definition of the two trade policy variables, i.e. OTRI_NTB & OTRI_TARIF 
4 Data on restrictiveness of domestic trade policy on exports was not available among the family of Trade 
Restrictiveness Indices. Nevertheless, the use of MA_OTRI allows us to draw indirect lesson as to the effect of export 
restriction on TFP. This is because; the qualitative impact of foreign restriction on home country’s exports is similar to 
that of domestic restriction on a country’s exports.  
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All the three trade policy variables are expected to have a negative effect on TFP through their 
restrictive role on openness.  
3.1.2 Institutions 
 In the current study, INST measures institutional quality (government effectiveness). Governance 
quality in a country pertains to the process by which governments assume power and are held 
accountable; government’s capacity to formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of 
the state and citizens for the social and economic institutions (Kauffman et al, 2009).  
The governance indicator has the following six dimensions by which it reflects the aforementioned 
features: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.  The measure of institutions used in the current study (INST) 
is a simple average of the above six indicators.5  
A difference in the quality of governance is believed to explain substantial TFP variation across 
countries, triggering differences in the return to economic activity.  They matter to TFP in a manner 
by which checks and balances for governments against expropriation are established; governments 
ensure an economic climate that could increase confidence among the private sector and increase 
(expected) return to economic activity. A significant correlation between the trade policy variables 
and the measure of governance quality means that we should control for the effect of the latter while 
trying to identify the effect of trade policy on TFP.  
A country with higher quality of institutions compared to another one is expected to have higher TFP, 
other things being equal. Thus, 𝛽2  in equation (1) above is expected to be significantly positive.  
                                                          
5  Measuring institutional quality as a simple average of the governance indicators implicitly assumes equal 
contribution to TFP from each indicator. This is used (though may not be appropriate) because, judging otherwise 
would be speculative. Other studies that use similar method of measuring institutional quality include Easterly and 
Levine (2003). 
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3.1.3 Geography 
The core specification controls for the effect of geography related measures, namely distance from 
the equator (absolute latitude); whether a country is landlocked or not; and continent specific effects.   
The fact that most poor countries (e.g about 90% of Sub-Saharan Africa) are located within the tropics 
and most of the prosperous nations lie in the temperate zones could be immediate observational 
evidence that geography matters for economic performance.  The well known explanations for such 
dichotomy often relates to agricultural productivity and disease prevalence.   Crop productivity in the 
tropics is very low compared to the temperate regions. Maize productivity, for example, is about three 
times higher in the temperate region than in the tropics (Gallup et al, 1999). Malaria prevalence is 
widespread in the tropics holding back labour productivity growth, especially farmers’ productivity 
in many countries where agriculture is the mainstay of the economy.  The favourable climate for 
infestation of crop pests and insects is an additional impediment to the already low productive 
agricultural sector in the tropical region.  The current study employs a measure of distance from the 
equator (LATITUDE) as a proxy for variations in the above mentioned latitude related features in 
order to account for the resulting influence on TFP. 
The second measure of geography relates to whether a country has access to the sea.  Sea transport is 
the cheapest means to transport goods across countries.  Thus, landlocked countries face higher 
transportation cost which would reduce the level of international trade and the associated productivity 
gains from trade, other things held constant.  To account for the contribution of having access to the 
sea on TFP, the study controls for a dummy (LANDLOCK) which takes a value of one if the country 
is landlocked and zero otherwise.  To capture the effect of other geography related factors that can 
not necessarily be accounted for by the above two geographic measures, the study also controls for 
continent specific effects by defining CONTINENT dummies (AFRICA, ASIA, EUROPE, 
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AMERICAS and OCEANIA).  Higher latitude and being landlocked respectively are expected to 
have a positive and negative effect on TFP.  
The fact that geography enters significantly in different specifications for measures of economic 
performance implies that failure to control for this variable may cause omitted variable bias.  
Particularly, by omitting geography we may overstate the role of policies on economic growth (Gallup 
et al, 1999).6   
3.2     Data 
The study is constrained by data availability especially for human capital, which is required to 
compute TFP from the Cobb-Douglas production function; and the trade policy variables. The sample 
initially includes 25 low income, 32 middle income and 9 high income countries with a total of 66 
countries.7   However it is only 52 counties for which both average years of schooling and Trade 
policy data are available, which has forced me to do most of the analysis using data for those 52 
countries, which finally comprises of 16 low income, 27 middle income and 9 high income countries. 
All countries included in the sample are non oil countries based on the classification in Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992).  
In the TFP specification, average values of TFP for the years 2001-2003 is used for two reasons:   
a. The TRIs are estimated based on average import and export data for 2001-2003; and average 
tariff and NTBs data for 2000-2003. The trade policy indices used in the study are proxy for 
restrictiveness of trade policy measured by the response of import or export for which average 
                                                          
6 This view is reflected in the data where LATITUDE has high correlation with  the measure of institution  and other 
policy variables (see Table 8) 
7 The country classification is according to World Bank (2009).  Table 9 in Appendix E reports the country list. 
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data for the years 2001-2003 is used.  Thus, it is appropriate to use the corresponding average 
figures for TFP in a specification where we estimate the impact of trade policy on TFP. 
b. In a cross section setting, using average of TFP would reduce business cycle effects by 
smoothing out short run fluctuations.  
Average data for 2001-2003 is used for the remaining variables except explicitly stated otherwise. 
Population, investment share, real GDP per capita and real openness data are from Penn world table 
version 6.2. Real GDP and investment data are constructed using information on population, real 
GDP per capita and investment share data. Labour force data is available in world development 
indicators (2008) CD ROM.  Recent data on average years of schooling for the year 2000 is obtained 
from Barro and Lee (2000). The parameter values for capital share is assumed to be one-third (α=1/3) 
as in HJ. Capital stock is estimated using perpetual inventory method.8  
 
3.3   Estimation, Identification & Inference  
3.3.1 Estimation 
The TFP equation is first estimated using OLS to see the partial correlations between TFP and its 
‘core’ determinants including trade policy.  In the presence of possible feedback effect from TFP to 
the measure of Non Tariff Barriers, the OLS estimates might not speak of causality that runs from the 
later to TFP.   Likewise, TFP may affect INST where the later is included in the TFP equation. To 
account for the possible endogeneity of these variables, 2SLS estimation technique is employed. In 
the presence of weak identification, the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator 
                                                          
8 Description of data and source for the remaining variables is also made In   Appendix A. 
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performs better than 2SLS. For this reason, an alternative estimation for the ‘core’ TFP equation is 
made using LIML.  
3.3.2 Identification 
Reverse causality is a main challenge plaguing identification of the effect from one of our variables 
of interest i.e., OTRI_NTB on TFP. The political economy literature underscores the fact that 
protection is endogenously determined through the influence of lobbying   groups on policy makers 
(Lee and Swagel, 1997; Trefler, 1993).   
Among the various dimensions, trade patterns affect the nature of protection. Different arguments are 
made to support this claim.  One view is that higher past imports may trigger various interest groups 
to lobby policy makers for an increased protection in which case NTBs on imports of an industry 
would rise in response to an increase in imports share of goods in the industry. Based on this 
argument, NTBs and past import shares would have a positive association.  As this may induce 
retaliation by trading partners, however, policy makers may depend their decision on the importance 
of imports measured by share of imports in domestic use; and the importance of exports measured by 
export share in the output of each industry (Lee and Swagel, 1997). The latter argument would imply 
a reduction in import restrictions as a result of increased export share of an industry, implying a 
negative association between NTBs on imports of an industry and past export shares in the industry. 
9  In line with the above arguments, the current study uses past import, past changes in import and 
past export (all as a share of GDP)  to  instrument  Non tariff barriers. The theoretical justification to 
use export share of output in each industry normally requires industry level data on NTB and export 
shares. Due to data availability, the study employs NTBs, export shares and import shares data 
aggregated at the country level. As will be seen later in the analysis, NTBs is associated with past 
                                                          
9 Rodrik (1995) also noted that  the investment subsidies such as lifting import restriction to Taiwanese and Korean firms 
was in practice  contingent on the firms’ ability to compete  in the world market.  
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export shares and the past import shares significantly with a sign consistent with the theoretical 
arguments.  The additional instrument used is the share of NTBs in the tariff lines where a core-NTB 
is binding (share of tariff line for which ad-valorem equivalent of NTB is statistically different from 
zero at 5% level) (see Kee et al, 2009).10  The OTRI_NTB equation below is estimated in the first 
stage regression: 
𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐼_𝑁𝑇𝐵  = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑋𝑃99𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑀𝑃99𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑑𝐼𝑀𝑃00𝑖 + 𝛾4 𝑆ℎ_𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                     (2) 
where EXP99, IMP99, dIMP00 and Sh_NTB  denote  export share  of GDP in 1999, import share  of 
GDP in 1999, change in import share of GDP  in 2000 and the Share of NTBs  respectively are the 
excluded instruments where as  𝑋𝑖 represents the included instruments. 𝑢𝑖 is an error term. 
The remaining two trade policy measures are the tariff barriers of a country on its imports 
(OTRI_TARIF) and export restrictions by all trade partners (MA_OTRI). The latter is believed to be 
exogenous and is not influenced by home country’s TFP.  A country’s tariffs on imports are also 
usually bound by bilateral or multilateral agreements (Lee and Swagel, 1997; Trefler, 1993). Among 
others, examples of such agreements include GAAT, WTO, and the South African Customs Union 
(SACU).  Under such agreements import tariffs are determined externally.11  For this reason, the 
current study also assumes the trade policy index based on import tariffs i.e., OTRI_TARIF, as 
exogenous.12 
INST, measuring governance quality is the other variable to which feedback effect may run from 
TFP.  Countries with higher TFP may have the incentive and capacity to set up enabling economic 
                                                          
10 This variable has a considerable level of correlation with NTB by construction and is used to supplement the above 
mentioned instruments. The use of this instrument fulfills the statistical requirement of being a source of exogenous 
variation for NTB.  
11 In fact, Lee and swagel (1997) uses import tariffs as part of their instruments to identify the impact of NTB on 
imports. 
12 Also, the endogeneity test where the null considers OTRI_TARIF as exogenous is always accepted (not reported). 
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environment that enhance the confidence of private investors and households, on which the 
measurement of institution in the current study basically depends. To account for this feedback effect, 
the study employs the widely used language instruments from Hall and Jones (1999) i.e.,  proportion 
of the population speaking English at birth (EngFrac), and proportion of the population speaking one 
of the major European languages at birth (EurFrac).  Equation 3 below is estimated in the first stage 
regression for INST.  
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐸𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑢𝑟𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                     (3)  
where INST is a proxy for institutional quality (government effectiveness) , EngFrac  and EurFrac 
are  as defined above,  while 𝑋𝑖 denotes the included instruments. 𝜇𝑖 is an error term.   
In a situation where some of the instruments in the first stage regression have a strong effect on both 
INST and OTRI_NTBs, the predicted values for both endogenous variables will have considerable 
collinearity in the second stage regression. This creates difficulty in identifying the individual effects 
from INST and NTBs (See also Dollar and Kray, 2003). For this reason, the TFP equation is estimated 
excluding INST in some of the specifications where a test for overidentifictaion is used to see if the 
instruments for OTRI_NTB are not terribly correlated with the excluded INST.  
3.3.3 Inference  
Various  diagnostic  tests  are  made  to  test  whether  the  statistical  requirements  related  to  
our instruments are met whereby we can make reliable inference.  
 
A test for instrument relevance is made using two methods:  First, when either OTRI_NTB or  
INST is included separately in the TFP estimation, the F-statistics from the first stage regression  
is used  to  see  if  there  is  a  concern  for  weak  identification.13  Second, when TFP is  
                                                          
13  The rule of thumb is that an F-statistics of <10% is a cause for concern (Staiger and Stock, 1997)  
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estimated controlling for both INST and O T R I _ NTB, the F-statistics from the first stage  
regression is not informative of whether instruments are weak (see Staiger and Stock, 1997) and  
hence we rely on an alternative method. In the latter case, a test for weak identification is  
made using a test statistic by Stock and Yogo(2002) which is  based on the Cragg-Donald( 
1993) F-statistics (Stock and Yogo, 2002).  Critical values are tabulated in Stock and Yogo  
(2002) for test of weak identification that depends on the estimator being used, whether the  
concern is bias or size distortion, and the number of instruments and endogenous variables.  
When the concern of weak identification is bias, the Cragg-Donald (hence forth C-D) statistics  
can be compared with the critical values that correspond to a certain threshold level of bias  
from using IV relative to OLS. On the other hand, when instruments are weak, the Wald test  
for significance of the coefficients of the endogenous variables rejects very often (see Baum et al,  
2003). Thus, if the concern of weak identification   has to do with the performance of the Wald  
test statistics (size distortion), the test statistics is compared with the critical values  
corresponding to the tolerable level of rejection rate when the standard rejection rate is 5%. To  
test the presence of weak identification, the C-D statistics is compared to the critical values for  
size distortion. This will suggest whether to rely on the individual significance of the  
endogenous variables from the standard t-test.  Since the C-D statistics assumes i.i.d. errors,  
the pagan-Hall hetroscedasticity test result is also reported together with the C-D statistics. If  
the weak instruments lead to high rejection rate of the Wald test, we cannot rely on the  
standard individual t-statistics to tell about the individual significance of NTBs  in explaining  
TFP variation.  In such a situation, an alternative test which is robust to the presence of weak  
instruments is used to test whether the endogenous variables are jointly insignificant. The  
Andersen-Rubin (A-R) test statistics serves this purpose. The A-R test has a null hypothesis that  
the coefficients of the endogenous variables are jointly equal to zero. Rejection of the null, where 
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both INST and OTRI_NTB enter in to the TFP equation would mean that at least both INST 
and OTRI_NTB together have a significant effect on TFP. Tests for  the validity of the instruments 
are made using Hansen statistics. The Hansen statistics, which is robust to violation of 
homoscedasticity, tests whether the excluded instruments are orthogonal to the error term.  
4.      Estimation Results and Discussion  
 
In an effort to test the main hypothesis of whether trade policy has a significant effect on TFP, the 
‘core’ TFP equation is estimated using OLS, 2SLS and LIML.14 The current section discusses the 
estimation results. The discussion approach is in such a way that a question that led to estimation of 
various specifications is raised first, followed by discussion of the results using evidence from the 
findings.   
4.1  Estimating the openness equation: OLS & 2SLS 
Does trade policy affect openness?  In line with the hypothesis laid out by the theoretical discussions 
made before, the current study assumes that trade policy affects TFP mainly through its impact on 
openness. It would thus be an obvious interest to test if trade policy indeed has the expected effect on 
openness, so that we have a background idea to later interpret as to how trade policy influences TFP. 
For this reason, as a first pass exercise, an openness equation is estimated controlling for its major 
determinants and including the three trade policy variables using OLS and 2SLS. The first stage 
results for the 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 5 in Appendix C, where Sh_NTB and EXP99 
are the excluded instruments for OTRI_NTB. Both columns show that OTRI_NTB is weakly 
identified based on the rule of thumb. Thus, the t-statistics in the second stage estimation cannot be 
                                                          
14 The ‘core TFP equation’   refers to the TFP equation including the proxy measures for trade policy, institutional 
quality, latitude and whether a country is landlocked. 
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used to make inference about the significance of OTRI_NTB.  We rather rely on the A-R test to tell 
whether OTRI_NTB have a significant effect on openness. Table 1 below shows the results for the 
second stage regression.  
Table 1: OLS & 2SLS estimation results for the Openness equation. 
VARIABLES OLS OLS  OLS OLS  2SLS        2SLS  
      
lny  0.14** 0.17***  0.11*  0.13** 0.18***     0.17*** 
 (2.08) (3.03) (1.710) (2.204) (2.63)      (2.91) 
OTRI_NTB -0.85*** -0.75***   -2.16***    -1.98*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.49)   (-4.468)    (-4.25) 
M_elast  0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14***  0.14*** 0.16***     0.15*** 
 (8.84) (11.91) (9.170) (9.132) (11.04)     (11.57) 
LANDLOCK -0.10** -0.09* -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.06       -0.08 
 (-2.30) (-1.813) (-2.892) (-2.745) (-1.227)    (-1.43) 
lnPOP  -0.10** 0.09*      0.01 -0.17***    -0.14*** 
  (-2.465) (1.875) (0.205) (-3.880)    (-3.36) 
lnSIZE   0.01 -0.08*** -0.05  0.04*       0.04 
  (0.462) (-2.987) (-1.419) (1.732)     (1.64) 
OTRI_TARIF   -0.54*** -0.47*             -0.35 
   (-2.706) (-1.982)             (-1.60) 
MA_OTRI   -0.84** -0.57  
   (-2.141) (-1.632)  
CONTINENTS   NO       YES       NO        YES        YES         YES 
Hansen J- 
Statistic                                            0.63        0.52 
A-R(p-value)                                         0.0001      0.0000 
      
N   52  52 54 54  51          51 
R2   0.750  0.873 0.742 0.777  0.78        0.81 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is logOPEN; CONTINENTS indicate whether the continent           
dummies (AFRICA, ASIA, AMERICAS, OCEANIA & EUROPE) are controlled (shown by ‘YES’) or not controlled 
(shown by ‘NO’); *,** &*** denote significance of coefficient estimates at 10%,5% & 1% levels 
respectively ; t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Hansen J-statistic 
tests whether the instruments fulfill the over identifying restrictions; A-R is the Andersen-Rubin 
test of ‘weak instrument robust inference’ with a null hypothesis that the coefficients of all 
endogenous variables in the second stage estimation are jointly insignificant. A constant, is 
estimated, but not reported. 
Columns (1) - (4) show the OLS results, while (5) & (6) are the 2SLS results. Overall trade 
restrictiveness index based on non tariff barriers (OTRI_NTB) and overall trade restrictiveness index 
based on Tariffs (OTRI_TARIF), both measuring restriction on imports; and Market Access – overall 
trade restrictiveness (MA_OTRI), measuring restriction on exports of the home country by all trading 
18 
 
partners, are all included in different specifications in Table 1.15 Real GDP (lny) and import demand 
elasticity (M_elast) are proxies for domestic demand. Both enter significantly with the expected sign 
in most of the specifications.   Following Frankel and Romer (1999), population (lnPOP), and 
country’s land area (lnSIZE) are also introduced, with the expectation that both would have a negative 
impact on the openness of the home country. Population in columns (2) & (5); and country’s size in 
column (3) are shown to have a significant negative association with openness. NTBs are shown to 
have a strong negative association with openness in columns (1) and (2). The A-R test in columns (5) 
& (6) also suggests that NTBs have a significant negative impact on openness. Columns (3) & (4) 
show a significant negative association of tariff barriers with openness although the finding is not 
robust in alternative specifications. Particularly, in column (6), once we control for NTBs, the effect 
of Tariffs on openness becomes insignificant.  Likewise, column (3) shows a strong negative 
association between export restrictions and openness, but the correlation becomes insignificant when 
continent specific effects are taken in to account in column (4).  
Table 1 clearly shows that even after controlling for the major determinants of openness (as can be 
seen from fairly high R2), the three trade policy measures have a negative association with openness.  
Unlike Tariffs and export restrictions which have a less significant and inconsistent effect on 
openness, NTBs have a consistently significant downward pressure on openness.  Other studies that 
have also shown a relatively stronger effect of NTBs on trade include Trefler (1993), Feenstra (2004), 
and Haveman and Thursby (2000).  
The relatively more restrictive power of NTBs compared to Tariffs suggested by the current evidence 
can be understood using support from theory. It is argued in Feenstra (2004) that when markets are 
not perfectly competitive, Tariffs and NTBs aimed at achieving the same level of import would have 
                                                          
15 Note that throughout the paper the terms ‘NTBs’, ‘Tariffs’ and ‘export restrictions’ are used interchangeably with 
OTRI_NTB, OTRI_TARIF and MA_OTRI respectively to reduce technicality.  
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different impact on price of imports, i.e., NTBs would raise import price at a higher magnitude than 
do Tariff barriers.  This is because in the case of imperfect competition, NTBs allow market power 
to importing firms to influence the domestic price.   Feenstra (2004) also argued that under imperfect 
competition, where firms could treat their foreign markets as segmented and charge different prices 
in each market, it is very likely that a foreign exporter will absorb part of the import tariff imposed 
by the importing country. In such a case, import prices do not rise by the full amount of the tariff. 
The above two theoretical arguments render NTBs as more restrictive than Tariffs.  Feenstra (2004) 
supplement his second theoretical argument above with an empirical evidence showing  that in 
1983/84 , Japanese car firms  absorb  a portion of  the import tariffs imposed by the US – of the 21% 
rise in Import tariffs , only 12% (0.58*21%) was reflected as an addition  in US prices , while  the 
remaining 9% was absorbed  by Japanese firms. Using industry level data, Trefler (1993) found a 
very strong downward pressure of NTBs on US imports for 1983. He neglected Tariffs in the analysis 
assuming that they are dominated by NTBs during the period, emphasizing the restrictive role of the 
later. Haveman and Thursby (2000), using a disaggregated trade policy and agricultural trade volume 
data, showed that NTBs have a very larger reduction effect on overall trade volume than do Tariffs. 
The above theoretical arguments, the subsequent empirical evidences together with the current 
evidence show that NTBs have a more restrictive role on openness than do Tariffs. As will be seen 
later in the analysis, the relatively more restrictive role of NTBs on openness   will also be reflected 
in the TFP regression, where trade policy is assumed to influence TFP mainly through openness.  
Having demonstrated the negative association of trade policy in general with openness and a 
significant downward pressure on openness from NTBs, the next question would thus be to ask if 
trade policy has a strong effect on TFP.  
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Does Trade policy affect TFP?  To examine how Trade policy is associated with TFP and identify 
the effect of trade policy on TFP, a TFP regression equation is estimated using OLS, 2SLS & LIML. 
The following section discusses the results for each estimation technique.   
4.2 Estimating the ‘core’ TFP equation: OLS 
Table 2 below shows the results for the OLS estimation where TFP is estimated with and without 
geography; including institutions and NTBs together and separately; and controlling for Tariffs and 
export restrictions. NTBs are shown to have a negative association with TFP after controlling for 
institutions (column 1), and institutions and geography (column 2).  In column (5), all the three trade 
policy variables, i.e., OTRI_NTB and MA_OTRI are correlated with TFP, being correctly signed. 
Tariffs and export restrictions are not significant, however, as in column (4) where they enter with 
institutions and geography. While export restrictions are always signed correctly, tariffs mostly enter 
with the wrong sign sometimes being significant. Columns (1), (3) & (4) show that countries with 
better governance quality (institutions) have higher TFP, other things being equal. Location farther 
from the equator is also strongly associated with higher TFP in columns (5) & (6). Due to the tendency 
to find better institutions with higher latitudes, however, the latter two are highly correlated which 
can be seen from columns (2) & (4) where both loose much significance compared to the cases where 
they enter individually. Other things being equal, landlocked countries have lower TFP as suggested 
by columns (2), (4), (5) and (6).  
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Table 2: OLS estimation results for the ‘Core’ TFP Equation.  
VARIABLES   (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)        (5)         (6) 
       
OTRI_NTB -1.49*** -1.41***   -1.22**  
 (-3.120) (-2.969)   (-2.047)  
INST 0.13*** 0.08 0.22*** 0.12*   
 (3.451) (1.509) (5.219) (1.729)   
LATITUDE  0.39  0.38 0.66** 0.72*** 
  (1.177)  (1.339) (2.286) (2.845) 
LANDLOCK  -0.23*  -0.22** -0.22* -0.25*** 
  (-1.799)  (-2.510) (-1.844) (-2.866) 
OTRI_TARIF   0.89* 0.59 -0.00 0.11 
   (1.968) (1.134) (-0.00756) (0.192) 
MA_OTRI   -0.39 -0.93 -0.84 -1.35** 
   (-0.650) (-1.309) (-0.981) (-2.336) 
CONTINENTS   NO       YES       NO          YES       YES       YES  
       
N           53 53 57 57 52 57 
R-squared 0.320 0.443 0.344 0.474 0.431 0.436 
Notes: Dependent variable is logTFP; *,** &*** denote significance level of coefficient estimates at 
10%, 5%  & 1% respectively ; t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parenthesis; a 
constant, is estimated,but not reported; CONTINENTS are as described in Table 1.   
 
The results in Table 2 show the partial correlations between TFP and its ‘core determinants’ including 
trade policy. NTBs have a strong negative association with TFP after controlling for institutions, 
geography and other trade policy variables. Tariffs and export restrictions, on the other hand, do not 
have significant correlation with TFP in most of the cases.  A graphical demonstration of the 
correlation between TFP and its ‘core determinants’ in  Figure 1 below also tell  more or less  similar 
story as the partial correlations in  Table 2 do. 
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Figure 1: Simple correlation between TFP and its ‘Core determinants’ 
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4.3 Estimating the ‘core’ TFP equation: 2SLS 
The OLS regression results in Table 2 do not tell about the causal effect of OTRI_NTBs on TFP due 
to the presence of a possible feedback effect from the latter to OTRI_NTB.  Likewise, reverse 
causality may have also run from TFP to INST. To identify the causal effects of NTBs and Institutions 
on TFP, 2SLS regression is made and the results are reported in Table 3 below. 16 
Table 3: 2SLS estimation results for the ‘core’ TFP equation 
VARIABLES     (1)  (2)  (3)        (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
OTRI_NTB 
 
-1.00 
 
-1.14 
 
-1.99*** 
 
-1.64*** 
  
-1.45** 
 (-1.295) (-1.417) (-3.161) (-2.667)  (-2.43) 
INST 0.20*** 0.12   0.27***  
 (4.246) (1.440)   (3.273)  
LATITUDE  0.31 0.61** 0.56*** -0.09 0.62*** 
  (0.899) (2.501) (2.903) (-0.299) (3.16) 
LANDLOCK  -0.24* -0.21* -0.24** -0.19** -0.24** 
  (-1.901) (-1.810) (-2.349) (-2.251) (-2.39) 
OTRI_TARIF 1.13** -0.15 
(2.163) (-0.336) 
MA_OTRI -0.29 
                        (-0.458) 
CONTINENTS NO YES YES NO  NO   NO 
 
P-H(p-value) 0.94 0.72 - - - - 
C-D statistic 4.88 3.19 - - - - 
Hansen J stat 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.52 0.27 
A-R(p-value) 0.00 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 0.0012 0.0013 
 
N 52 52 52 52 57 51 
R2 0.286 0.434 0.413 0.376 0.394 0.386 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is logTFP; *,** &*** denote significance level of coefficient estimates 
at 10%,5% & 1% respectively ; t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis; a 
constant is estimated, but not reported; CONTINENTS are as defined in Table 1;P-H refers to Pagan-
Hall and tests a null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors; C-D refers to the Cragg-Donald statistics 
which is compared to the Stock- Yogo (2005) critical values for testing weak identification ; 
Hansen J-statistics tests a null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are orthogonal to 
the error term; and A-R refers to Andersen – Rubin test for weak instrument robust inference 
which tests a null hypothesis that the endogenous variables are jointly insignificant. 
 
As in the OLS case, TFP is estimated including INST and OTRI_NTB together and separately; with 
and without geography. The first two columns show the results when institutions and NTBs are 
                                                          
16 The results for the first stage regression are reported in Table 6 of Appendix C.  EXP99, IMP99, dIMP00 and Sh_NTB 
are used to instrument OTRI_NTBs while EngFrac and EurFrac are the instruments for INST.     
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included together, with geography (in column 2) and without geography (in column 1).  In both 
columns (1) & (2), the C-D statistics indicate that we cannot reject a maximum size distortion of 20%. 
The corresponding critical values needed to reject a maximum size distortion of 20% for 2 
endogenous variables and 6 excluded instruments should exceed   9.10 (see Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
The A-R test in both columns rejects the null hypothesis that both INST and OTRI_NTB are jointly 
insignificant. Thus, we can make the inference that at least both institution and NTBs jointly have a 
significant effect on TFP.  As lower level of institutions (lower governance quality) may result in 
higher NTBs, it is difficult to see the effect of NTBs when both institutions and NTBs are included 
together in the TFP equation. This is also reflected in the data as shown in Figure 2 below where 
countries with higher governance quality (institutions) have lower NTBs compared to those with 
lower governance quality.   
Figure 2: simple correlation between NTBs and Institutions (Governance Quality) 
 
Also, some of the instruments in the first stage regression have a strong predictive power for both 
institutions and NTBs.17  In such a case, a considerable collinearity between the predicted values of 
                                                          
17 This can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 where EXP99 is significant in both INST and OTRI_NTB equations; and 
in columns (3) &(4) where Sh_NTB and LATITUDE enter significantly for both INST and OTRI_NTB equations.  
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institutions and NTBs create a difficulty to see the effect of NTBs in the second stage regression (See 
also Dollar and Kray, 2002). One way to consider is to estimate TFP excluding institutions and test 
whether the excluded instruments for NTBs are not terribly correlated with the omitted institutions. 
The test for over identification is suggestive in this regard.  This is done in columns (3), (4), & (6).    
Column (3) and (4) show the results when TFP is estimated controlling for NTBs with and without 
geography respectively. In both columns the over identification test accepts at 10% level. NTBs in 
column (3) are however weakly identified based on the rule of thumb. Nonetheless, the A-R test 
suggests that NTBs have a generally significant impact on TFP. In column (4), when CONTINENTS 
are not controlled the F-statistics for the first stage regression becomes barely above the rule of thumb 
level (with F=11.08).18 Thus, column (4) shows a negative significant (at 1 % level) negative effect 
of NTBs on TFP. More specifically, a country with a 0.01 unit higher OTRI_NTBs compared to 
another country would have a 1.64% lesser TFP, other things being equal.  
Column (6) is similar to (4) except that the former controls for Tariffs. The F-statistics in the first 
stage regression (column 8 of Table 6) shows that identification is weak but the A-R test suggests 
that inference is possible.  As in the OLS case, Tariffs have a mixed sign. It is significant with a 
positive sign in column (4). Likewise, export restrictions have a negative but insignificant impact on 
TFP.   The data suggests that countries that face higher restriction on their export also impose higher 
NTBs on their imports making the two trade policy variables highly correlated (see Table 8). For this 
reason, NTBs and MA_OTRI both become insignificant when they are included together in the 2SLS 
regression (not reported).  
                                                          
18See column 6 of Table 6 in Appendix C.  For 1 endogenous variable and 4 excluded instruments this value can be 
used to reject a size distortion of more than 20 %( Stock and Yogo, 2002 table 5.2). 
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In column (5), institutions are shown to have a strong positive effect on TFP.19 Similar to the OLS 
case, when LATITUDE is included with INST (column 2 & 5), it doesn’t appear to be significant. 
On the other hand, in columns (3), (4) & (6), where INST is excluded, LATITUDE becomes 
significant at conventional levels.  
Similar to the OLS case, columns (2) - (6) show that other things being equal, land locked countries 
have lower TFP than those who have access to the sea. In the theoretical review section, it is argued 
that trade boosts TFP through a number of channels such as through facilitating intra-industry 
resource reallocation to more efficient firms; technology diffusion, enabling firms acquire new ways 
of production that makes them competitive; reducing rent seeking activities by enhancing 
competition. Other things being equal, the fact that the abovementioned benefits of trade are present 
to a lesser extent in a landlocked country than a one with access to the sea results in a lower TFP in 
the landlocked country.     
4.4 Estimating the ‘core’ TFP equation: LIML 
In most of the 2SLS estimations, identification was shown to be weak. In the presence of weak 
instruments, limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) performs better than 2SLS.20  For this 
reason, the 2SLS estimation of the core TFP equation in Table 3 is re-estimated with the LIML of 
which the results are reported in Table 4 below. Using the LIML estimation, we are now able to reject 
a size distortion of more than 10% or 15% in all columns, which enable us to rely on the standard t-
statistics while interpreting the significance of coefficient estimates for OTRI_NTB. In general, the 
                                                          
19 Column (7) of Table 6 also shows that identification is strong.  
20 Under the assumption of i.i.d. errors, LIML is unbiased estimator of second order in the presence of weak 
instruments (Stock, write and Yogo, 2002; Hahn and Hausman, 2004). As a result the critical values for weak 
identification test in the case of LIML estimation are smaller compared to the 2SLS estimation (See Stock and Yogo, 
2002). 
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LIML estimates are more or less similar to the 2SLS ones in Table 3 except that the former is less 
significant.21   
Table 4:  LIML estimation results for the ‘core’ TFP equation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)         (6) 
 
 
OTRI_NTB 
 
-0.88 
 
-0.96 
 
-2.18** 
 
-1.70* 
  
-2.24** 
 (-0.826) (-0.792) (-2.114) (-1.897)  (-2.13) 
INST 0.21*** 0.14   0.27**  
 (2.875) (1.575)   (2.129)  
LATITUDE  0.28 0.60** 0.56** -0.10 0.64** 
  (0.850) (2.257) (2.422) (-0.234) (2.21) 
LANDLOCK  -0.24** -0.21** -0.23** -0.22** -0.21** 
  (-2.386) (-2.041) (-2.491) (-2.183) (-2.20) 
OTRI_TARIF     1.07 -0.17 
     (1.423) (-0.34) 
MA_OTRI     -0.44  
     (-0.727)  
CONTINENTS NO YES YES NO NO YES 
P-H(p-value)       
C-D statistic 4.87 3.19 8.67 11.16 7.29 8.34 
A-R(p-value) 0.001 0.02 0.005 0.04 0.06 0.004 
Hansen J-stat 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.43 0.10 
 
N 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
51 
R2 0.272 0.427 0.408 0.375 0.364 0.385 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is logTFP;*,**&*** denote significance level of coefficient 
estimates at 10%,5% &1% respectively ; t-statistics in  parenthesis; a constant is 
estimated but not reported; CONTINENTS and diagnostic tests are as described in Table 3. 
 
 
In columns (3), (4) & (6), the C-D statistics imply that we can reject a size distortion of more than 
10%.  The evidence in columns (3) suggests that after accounting for the effect from geography, 
NTBs are found to have a negative significant (at 5% level) effect on TFP. In column (6), where 
Tariffs are now controlled, unlike column (3), NTBs maintain their significant impact while Tariffs 
are insignificant.  Considering column (6), for instance, a country with 0.01 unit higher OTRI_NTB 
compared to another, has a 2.24% lesser TFP, other things being equal.  
                                                          
21 The fact that the LIML estimator does not have a sample mean makes it more dispersed than the 2SLS estimator 
(see Hahn and Hausman, 2004). 
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The results with regard to other determinants remain more or less similar to Table 3 and thus do not 
need further explanation. Similar to the OLS and 2SLS estimation, the major finding that stands out 
with regard to trade policy is the relatively stronger effect of NTBs compared to Tariffs.  
Considering the OLS, 2SLS & LIML results, two major findings come out: First, the empirical 
evidence suggests that imports are more important in channeling the role of trade to TFP than are 
exports. This is supported by the finding that the export restriction variable is insignificant in most of 
the cases, while OTRI_NTB is shown to have a strong downward pressure on TFP. This finding is 
qualitatively similar to Choudri and Hakura (2000); Johnson and Subramanian (2001) in that they 
found restriction on imports have a significant negative impact on TFP while restriction on export 
has a relatively little or no role on TFP.  In this regard, the current finding can be understood in line 
with some of the theoretical arguments made in section 2 i.e., higher NTBs impede the process of 
technology adoption particularly in countries that cannot afford the research and development cost to 
undertake technological innovation themselves (see Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). In a situation where 
manufacturing firms in most developing countries rely on import of intermediate inputs from the 
developed world, higher NTBs, raising their cost of production also slows down the process of 
industrialization.  Second, among restriction on imports the empirical evidence suggests that NTBs 
have a stronger downward pressure on TFP while Tariffs have a mixed, often insignificant impact on 
TFP. All the OLS, 2SLS and LIML estimations show that NTBs enter always with the correct sign, 
mostly significant at 1% or 5% levels. The relatively stronger effect of NTBs on TFP can be 
interpreted using support from theory and other relevant empirical studies: First, the interpretation 
goes in relation to the relative restrictive power of NTBs and Tariffs on openness through which the 
former two are mostly expected to impact TFP. In support for the previous empirical evidence in 
Table 1, where NTBs were shown to have a relatively more restrictive role on openness than do 
Tariffs, I noted two theoretical arguments in Feenstra(2004): First, when markets are not perfectly 
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competitive Tariffs and NTBs aimed at achieving the same level of imports would have different 
effect on import price, i.e.,  NTBs  would have stronger effect on import prices. This is because NTBs 
allow market power for importing firms to influence the domestic price. The second argument was 
that under imperfect competition, it is very plausible that a foreign exporting firm would absorb part 
of the import tariff imposed by the importing country in which case import prices do not rise by the 
full amount of the tariff. Both arguments support a more restrictive role of NTBs compared to Tariffs. 
The theoretical arguments are also backed by the empirical evidences mentioned before. The second 
line of argument may work together with the first interpretation to explain the stronger effect of NTBs. 
In addition to their restrictive role on trade, NTBs are believed to encourage a climate for rent-seeking 
activities. In countries where import quotas (one type of NTB) are licensed to domestic or foreign 
firms, the firms are often involved in rent seeking activities to get the license.  It is noted in Feenstra 
(2004) that foreign firms offer a huge amount of bribe to developing country officials to acquire the 
license. Thus, the ‘rent seeking’ channel could be taken as supplementary to the ‘openness’ channel 
to justify the stronger negative impact of NTBs on TFP.  
What do the findings from the 2SLS & LIML estimation tell in relation to the main question posed 
in the study? In most of the 2SLS estimation, OTRI_NTBs was found to have a generally significant 
negative effect on TFP.  Moreover, the LIML estimation has shown a significant (at 5% and 10% 
levels) negative effect of NTBs on TFP. Thus, the evidence suggests that differences in the levels of 
import restrictions by NTBs explain significant differences in TFP across countries. On the other 
hand, differences in the levels of import restrictions by tariffs and export restrictions by tariffs do not 
explain significant variation in TFP across countries.  
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5.       Conclusion 
This section summarizes the findings in relation to the major questions posed in the study.  
Trade Policy, particularly import restrictions by NTBs have a significant downward pressure on TFP. 
On the other hand, import restrictions by Tariffs and restrictions on a country’s export through tariff 
by all trading partners do not have a strong influence on TFP.  Consistent with the theories that link 
trade with TFP, the study showed that the strong effect of NTBs on TFP can be understood in relation 
to its strong restrictive impact on openness. Likewise, the study also showed that the insignificant 
effect of Tariffs and export restrictions on TFP could well be understood in relation to their less 
restrictive impact on openness. Thus, in general the findings suggest that variation in restrictiveness 
of trade policy, particularly non-tariff barriers, explain significant TFP differences across countries.   
Moreover, the findings also suggest that imports are more important in channeling the TFP gains of 
trade than are exports. Nonetheless, the study does not believe that all imports are equally important 
for TFP. Accordingly, a reduction in NTBs on different types of imports has different impact on TFP. 
No attempt is made, however, to examine the role of industry/product specific NTBs on TFP, which 
makes the policy implication that can be drawn from the findings a general one, i.e., countries should 
reduce NTBs on their imports to allow a gain in TFP associated with trade. Besides, the findings 
suggest that countries substitute the more restrictive and less transparent trade policy, i.e., NTBs with 
the less restrictive and more transparent trade policy, i.e., Tariffs.  This is plausible in the sense that 
the strong resistance particularly on the side of developing countries to reduce tariffs is partly because 
it accounts for a large share of government revenue. This makes it difficult to reduce or abandon 
tariffs without expanding the tax base or other sources of revenue, which is not feasible in the short 
run.  Moreover, tariffs can be used to exercise a reasonable level of protection, leaving some space 
for competition while NTBs on the other hand may unreasonably protect highly inefficient domestic 
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firms.  Thus, regional and international trade agreements should consider a reduction in NTBs in 
general and replacement of NTBs with Tariffs in particular. 
The evidence also suggests that more restrictive NTBs in general are a regular feature of trade policy 
in countries with low governance quality, making the distortionary effect of NTB significantly 
intertwined with lack of good governance.  Without improving the political institutions that set 
incentive for governments to adopt growth enhancing policies, it would still be in the interest of 
undemocratic governments to maintain higher NTBs. This is especially true when seen in light of the 
fact that NTBs create a less transparent climate for rent seeking whereby the officials in some 
developing countries divert huge public resources for their private use.  
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7. Appendices  
A. Data Description and Sources 
 EngFrac = Proportion of the population speaking English at birth; source: Hall and Jones 
(1999). 
 EurFrac = Proportion of the population speaking one of the European languages at birth; source: 
Hall and Jones (1999). 
 EXP99 = Share of export in GDP in the year 1999; source: World Development Indicators 
(2008) CD-ROM. 
 dEXP00 = Change in Export share in 2000 –Export share in 1999; source: World Development 
Indicators (2008) CD-ROM. 
 Hcap = Human capital in the year 2000, computed as shown in Appendix B; source: Barro and 
Lee (2000). 
 IMP99= Share of import in GDP in the year 1999; source: World Development Indicators 
(2008) CD-ROM. 
 INST= Institution used as proxy for governance quality and measured as the average of six 
governance indicators; source: Kaufman et al (2009). 
 LATITUDE = Absolute latitude (Distance from the equator); Source: Hall and Jones (1999). 
 LANDLOCK = measures access to the sea and takes a value of 1 if a country is landlocked  ; 
and 0 otherwise ; Source: http://www.wisegeek.com/what-countries-are-landlocked.htm  
  OTRI_NTB= Overall trade restrictiveness index based on ad-valorem equivalent of non tariff 
barriers.  Source: Kee et al (2009). 
 OTRI_TARIF= Overall trade restrictiveness index based on tariffs; Source: Kee et al (2009) 
 Sh_NTB = Share of Non tariff barriers:  measures the share of a core non tariff barrier in the 
tariff lines where a core non tariff barrier is binding; Source: Kee et al (2009). 
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 logTFP = Natural logarithm of Total factor Productivity. Computed as shown in Appendix B.  
B.  Formal Derivation of Variables 
i. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Production is assumed to take place using the technology: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
𝛼(𝐴𝑖𝐻𝑖)
1−𝛼                                                                                                                            (4) 
, where   𝑌𝑖, 𝐾𝑖, 𝐴𝑖 and  𝐻𝑖 denote  real GDP , physical capital stock , labour augmenting productivity 
(TFP) and human capital stock  respectively.  
Physical capital stock  𝐾𝑖 is calculated using the perpetual inventory method.   Human capital in each 
country is given by:    
 𝐻𝑖 = 𝑒
∅(𝐸𝑖)𝐿𝑖                                                                                                                                   (5)           
 , where an average worker in each country is assumed to have  𝐸𝑖 years of schooling. ∅(𝐸𝑖) is a 
functional form governing  the impact of schooling on human capital, while  𝐿𝑖 denote number of 
workers. Raising both sides of (4) by a power of  
1
1−𝛼
  gives us: 
 𝑌𝑖
1
1−𝛼 = 𝐾𝑖
𝛼
1−𝛼𝐴𝑖𝐻𝑖                                                                                                                          (6) 
Dividing both sides of (6) by 𝐿𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝛼
1−𝛼 ,  real GDP per worker  can be decomposed  in to capital intensity 
, human capital per worker and the  TFP term as  in (7) below. 
𝑦𝑖 = (
𝐾𝑖
𝑌𝑖
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
ℎ𝑖𝐴𝑖                                                                                                                            (7) 
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, where  𝑦𝑖 =
𝑌𝑖
𝐿𝑖
 ;  ℎ𝑖 = 
𝐻𝑖
𝐿𝑖
 are output per worker and human capital per worker respectively. Assuming   
∅(𝐸𝑖) a piece wise linear from mincerian wage regression and using (5), human capital per worker 
can be given as: 
 ℎ𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(∅𝑝𝑠𝑝 +  ∅𝑠𝑠𝑠 + ∅𝜏𝑠𝜏).                                                                                               (8) 
 ∅𝑝, ∅𝑠 and ∅𝜏  denote Mincerian returns for an additional year of schooling in the primary, secondary 
and tertiary schooling levels. Using data for 𝑌𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 , 𝐾𝑖 , available years of schooling ; and  assuming  
values for the capital share parameter and  Mincerian returns, it is possible to compute Total Factor 
Productivity (𝐴𝑖). Following HJ, a value of one-third is assumed for the capital share parameter; and 
mincerian returns to schooling are assumed to be 13.4%, 10.1% and 6.8% for primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling levels respectively.   
 
ii. Trade Policy Variables 
OTRI_AVE:  Ad-valorem equivalent of NTBs.      
It is a price equivalent of NTBs.  The ad-valorem equivalent of NTBs is constructed by transforming 
the quantity impact of NTBs in to price equivalents. An ad-valorem equivalent is defined as,  𝑎𝑣𝑒 
=
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑑)
𝑑𝑁𝑇𝐵
, where 𝑃𝑑  is domestic price. It is derived by making use of import demand elasticity and 
the quantitative impact of NTB in an import demand function as    shown below: 
    The quantity impact of NTB can be given by:   
        
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞𝑛,𝑐)
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑐
=
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑞𝑛,𝑐
(𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑛,𝑐
𝑑 )
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑛,𝑐
𝑑 )
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑐
= 𝜀𝑛,𝑐𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒                                                                         (9) 
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,where  𝑞𝑛,𝑐 are import quantities (𝑚𝑛,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑛
𝑤𝑞𝑛,𝑐) ; 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑐  is a binary dummy variable that indicates 
the presence of a core NTB. 𝑃𝑛
𝑤 is the exogenous world price of imports, here assumed to be unity; 
and  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐,𝑘 is the ad-valorem equivalent of NTB of type k imposed on good n in country c. 
Solving (9) for   𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐s yields:  
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝜀𝑛,𝑐
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑞𝑛,𝑐
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑐
=
𝑒𝛽𝑛,𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒
−1
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛,𝑐
                                                                                                   (10) 
,where    𝛽𝑛,𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 is a parameter in an import demand equation and measures the impact on the import 
of good n in country c of a core NTB(see Kee et al, 2009 pp6).  
Once  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 is obtained, it can be used together with ad-valorem tariff to compute OTRI. 
Define 𝑇𝑛,𝑐 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐 + 𝑡𝑛,𝑐 as the overall protection a counry imposes on its imports; where 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛,𝑐is 
the ad-valorem equivalent of NTB and  𝑡𝑛,𝑐 is the ad-valorem tariff. Overall trade restrictiveness index 
in country c is defined as: 
OTRI= 
∑ (
𝑑𝑚𝑛,𝑐
𝑑𝑝𝑛,𝑐
⁄ )𝑇𝑛,𝑐𝑛
∑ (
𝑑𝑚𝑛,𝑐
𝑑𝑝𝑛,𝑐
⁄ )𝑛
=
∑ 𝑚𝑛,𝑐𝜀𝑛,𝑐𝑇𝑛,𝑐𝑛
∑ 𝑚𝑛,𝑐𝜀𝑛,𝑐𝑛
                                                                                       (11) 
Here, OTRIc is defined as the weighted sum of protection levels. Weights in the first equality are the 
slope of import demand function while in the second equality they are given by import levels and   
elasticity of import demand.   The definition after the first equality solves the downward bias in 
restrictiveness of trade policy associated with the use of import weighted average Tariffs in the 
presence of prohibitive tariffs. The bias can be seen in the definition after the second equality.  
The OTRI_TARIF is computed using (16) and   𝑡𝑛,𝑐, the ad-valorem tariff instead of  𝑇𝑛,𝑐. The 
measure of OTRI_NTB is the ad valorem equivalent of NTBs computed using (10). 
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C. Regression Tables  
Table 5:  First Stage Regression (Corresponding to the 2SLS results In Table 1) 
  
VARIABLES OTRI_NTB OTRI_NTB 
   
 Sh_NTB            0.31*  0.34*   
                   (1.65) (2.42) 
 EXP99               -0.002*** -0.002*** 
                   (-3.748) (-3.475) 
 OTRI_TARIF -0.1 
 (-1.13) 
 lny            0.07**  0.07** 
           (2.21) (2.13) 
 M_elast            0.02**  0.02** 
           (2.551) (2.59) 
 LANDLOCK            0.02  0.02 
           (0.756) (0.72) 
 lnPOP           -0.06*** -0.05* 
           (-3.04) (-1.76) 
 lnSIZE            0.02**  0.01 
           (2.35)  0.89 
 CONTINENTS          YES 
 
 YES  
 
 F                   5.46  5.01 
   
 N            51  51 
 R-squared            0.57  0.58 
Notes: *, ** &*** denote significance level of coefficient estimates at 10%, 5% & 1%  
respectively; t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis; a constant  
is estimated but not reported.  
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
INST 
(2) 
OTRI_NTB 
(3) 
INST 
(4) 
OTRI_NTB 
(5) 
OTRI_NTB 
(6) 
OTRI_NTB 
(7) 
INST 
(8) 
OTRI_NTB 
 
EXP99 
 
0.03** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.01 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
  
-0.003*** 
 (2.381) (-5.348) (1.646) (-3.729) (-4.214) (-4.765)  (-4.585) 
IMP99 -0.02 0.003*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.003*** 
 (-1.389) (4.325) (0.540) (3.000) (3.313) (3.617)  (3.53) 
dIMP00 0.001 -0.003** 0.01 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*  -0.003** 
 (0.0695) (-2.178) (0.571) (-1.804) (-1.765) (-1.981)  (-1.87) 
Sh_NTB -1.01 0.19 -3.04** 0.30** 0.30** 0.30**  0.31** 
 (-0.883) (1.505) (-2.324) (2.459) (2.481) (2.649)  (2.61) 
EngFrac 1.71*** 0.00 1.22*** 0.01   0.71***  
 
EurFrac 
 
LATITUDE 
(6.618) 
0.48* 
(1.716) 
(0.152) 
-0.02 
(-0.984) 
(4.409) 
1.18*** 
(5.870) 
2.47*** 
(0.340) 
-0.02 
(-0.954) 
-0.09* 
 
 
 
-0.09** 
 
 
 
-0.11*** 
(2.77) 
0.4* 
(1.9) 
2.75*** 
 
 
 
-0.08*** 
   (3.585) (-2.010) (-2.240) (-3.097) (6.71) (-1.78) 
LANDLOCK   -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01 
OTRI_TARIF 
MA_OTRI 
CONTINENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
(-0.135) 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
(0.614) 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
(0.633) 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
(0.707) 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
(-1.35) 
-3.55*** 
(-2.99) 
-2.93*** 
(-2.85) 
NO 
(0.662) 
-0.09 
(-1.36) 
 
 
YES 
F     6.67 11.08 35.88 5.93 
 
N 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
52 
 
57 
 
51 
 
Table 6. First Stage Regression (corresponding to the 2SLS results in Table 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   R
2 
0.517 0.501 0.820 0.605 0.599 0.578 0.71 0.70 
Notes: *,** &*** denote significance level of coefficient estimates at 10%,5% & 1% respectively ; t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors in parenthesis; a constant is estimated but not reported.EXP99, IMP99 , dIMP00& Sh_NTB  
respectively refer to export share in 1999, import share in 1999 , change in import share in 2000 and the share of 
tariff lines for which there is a core NTB, while EngFrac and EurFrac are proxies for the fraction for the population 
speaking English and one of the major European languages at birth. CONTINENTS are as described in Table 1. Description 
of the variables can also be seen from Appendix A.
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D. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 7: Summary statistics (Major variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
lnTFP 53                    3.67 .29                   2.81                  4.21 
OTRI_NTB 53 .39 .05 .29 .54 
OTRI_TARIF 52 .11 .07  0 .44 
MA_OTRI 52 .16 .05 .075 .30 
INST 53 .02 .83                  -1.44                  1.81 
LATITUDE 53 .24 .16  .00 .66 
LANDLOCK 53 .15 .36   0 1 
LDCR 53                    3.50                  1.01                    1.24                 5.24 
Hcap 53                    2.22 .76                    1.11                  4.03 
 
 
 
Table 8: Pair wise Correlations (Major Variables)     
    lnTFP OTRI_NTB     OTRI_TARI 
         
MA_OTRI       INST 
 
LATITUDE 
     
LANDLOCK 
       
LDCR 
              
Hcap 
          
          
lnTFP 1        
OTRI_NTB -0.4534 1       
OTRI_TARI -0.0313 0.0664 1       
MA_OTRI -0.2146 0.4772 0.0683 1      
INST 0.5123 -0.4398 -0.4324 -0.2073 1     
LATITUDE 0.4427 -0.3554 -0.0086 -0.1214 0.6254 1    
LANDLOCK -0.37 0.2039 -0.1197 -0.016 -0.1027 -0.0501 1   
LDCR 0.5758 -0.4819 -0.225 -0.2215 0.746 0.5086 -0.2732  1  
Hcap 0.4005 -0.4283 -0.4551 -0.1931 0.8268 0.6442 -0.1188 
   
0.6325       1 
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E. List of countries included in the sample 
Table 9: List of countries in the sample 
 
Low income countries Middle income countries High income countries 
   Bangladesh Algeria Australia 
Benin Argentina Canada 
Cameroon Brazil Hong Kong 
Ghana Chile Hungary 
India China Japan 
Indonesia Colombia New Zealand 
Jordan Costa Rica Norway 
Kenya Egypt Trinidad &Tobago 
Malawi El Salvador United States 
Malaysia Guatemala  
Mali Honduras  
Rwanda Mauritius  
Senegal Mexico  
Tanzania Morocco  
Uganda Nicaragua  
Zambia Papua New Guinea  
 Paraguay  
 Peru  
 Philippines  
 Poland  
 South Africa  
 Sri Lanka  
 Sudan  
 Switzerland  
 Thailand  
 Tunisia  
 Turkey  
 Uruguay  
 Venezuela  
 
